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Tourism specialization and environmental
sustainability in a dynamic economy
Fabio Cerina
CRENoS and University of Cagliari
Abstract
This study focuses on the dynamic behaviour of a small open econ-
omy specialized in tourism based on natural resources. We analyse the
steady-state properties in two setups, with or without public abatement
expenditures and a unique locally saddle-point equilibrium is found for
both cases. The analysis of the transitional dynamics allows for an al-
ternative and "out-of-equilibrium" explanation for the observed positive
growth performance of small open tourists economies and for the world-
wide increase in tourist inows. Finally, for both setups, we analyse the
issue of market failures taking into account two di¤erent kinds of exter-
nality and nding the respective optimal tax rate able to induce private
agents to replicate the social optimum. The corrective policy, insofar it
leads to an increase in touristswillingness to pay, works as an "implicit"
tourist taxe paid by tourists. who are, on the other hand, compensated
with a better quality of the service purchased.
JEL CODES: H23, L83, O41, Q26, Q56.
KEYWORDS: Tourism Specialization, Sustainability, Growth, Envi-
ronmental quality, Transitional dynamics, Corrective tax, Pollution Abate-
ment.
1 Introduction
Recent empirical studies, such as Brau et al. (2005), have documented that,
in recent years, small "tourism-economies" have grown signicantly faster than
non-tourism ones and their income level is above the average for small economies.
Moreover, during the last 20 years, the growth performance of tourism economies
has been better than the average of the OECD countries. A bunch of papers
(Hazari and Sgrò, 1995, Lanza and Pigliaru, 1994 and 2000, Smeral, 2003, and
I would like to thank Davide Fiaschi, Luca Deidda, Javier Lozano, Rinaldo Brau and all
the partecipants at the conferences in Chia, Marrakech, Corte, Palma and Bologna for useful
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Nowak and Sahli, 2005, among them) have tried to provide an explanation for
such stylized facts. A common result of these works is that the positive growth
performance can be considered a long-run equilibrium phenomenon once we
allow tourism countries to "import" growth from abroad by means of continual
gains in the terms of trade. Notably, all these papers dont consider the role
of the environmental amenities and natural resources in the process of tourism
development where the positive growth performance has interested especially
countries whose tourism sector is based on natural and environmental resources.
On the other hand, many authors (Tisdell, 2001 and Davies and Cahill, 2000,
among them) pointed out that environmental resources interact with the process
of tourism development in at least two di¤erent ways: they positively a¤ect
touristspreferences towards the destination but, at the same time, they are
negatively a¤ected by touristsinows.
Once environmental resources are taken into account, some interesting ques-
tions arise: can growth be sustained in the long-run for a small open economy
specialized in tourism based on environmental resources? What are the dynamic
interactions between tourism development, residentswelfare and environmen-
tal resources? Does the market guarantee an optimal use of the environmental
resources or are there cases of market failure that might compromise to some
extent the growth performance or the levels of welfare attainable by these coun-
tries? What is the best way to respond to such market failures?
The main aim of this paper is to build a simple analytical framework where
such issues can be analysed in a proper way. We develop a dynamic general
equilibrium model where the main task of a small open economy specialized in
tourism based on environmental resources is to choose the number of tourists
to be hosted, the level of consumption and the fraction of income to be de-
voted to abatement e¤orts in order to maximize the long-run welfare of its
residents, which is assumed to depend on consumption level and environmental
quality. This choice has to take into account several dynamic trade-o¤s. First,
the number of tourists have an ambiguous e¤ect on welfare: on one hand, visi-
tors increase tourism revenues and consumption possibilities; on the other, since
tourists are assumed to negatively a¤ect the environmental stock of resources,
they also have a negative impact on welfare both directly (the environmental
resources enters the residents utility function) and indirectly (touristsare as-
sumed to give a positive value to the environmental quality and to be crowding
averse). Second, public abatement expenditures, in reducing residents con-
sumption possibilities, have a direct negative e¤ect on welfare but, in reducing
the marginal impact of tourists on the environment, they also have a positive
e¤ect on welfare by allowing for a higher (and in some cases increasing) number
of tourists in equilibrium and hence higher tourism revenues.
We analyse the dynamic properties of the model in two di¤erent setups,
with and without abatement expenditures. In both setups, the unique steady-
state is found to be a saddle point and the characteristics of the transitional
dynamics allows us to interpret as temporary and transitional some stylized
facts such as the positive growth performance of small open tourism economies
and the worldwide increasing number of tourists inows (WTO, 2006). Interest-
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ingly enough, when local authorities are able to reduce pollution ow by means
of the standard abatement technology considered here (see, among the others,
Smulders and Gradus, 1996 and Stokey 1998), the steady state level of envi-
ronmental quality is lower with respect to the no-abatement case. Moreover,
in the case with abatement only, when terms of trade are assumed to grow for
some exogenous reasons, environmental sustainability is showed to be compat-
ible with an increasing number of visitors in the steady state. By contrast, in
the no-abatement case, a necessary condition for environmental sustainability is
that the number of tourists remains constant in the steady state and exogenous
growth in the terms of trade only a¤ects steady state consumption which grows
at the same rate.
Prompted by the recent important political debate in Sardinia, where the
local government, motivated by the need to reduce the environmental impact
of tourists, has implemented a discussed system of taxes towards non-resident
second houses and use of some luxury goods, we also face some policy issues.
In doing that, we take into account two di¤erent kinds of externalities which
might arise in the process of tourism development: 1) a typical "tragedy of the
commons" situation, suggested by the non-excludable nature of the environ-
mental good; 2) an "informational" market failure according to which agents
are not aware of touristspreferences and therefore they do not take into ac-
count their own role in a¤ecting touristswillingness to pay (WTP) with their
actions. We implement the proper corrective policy in both setups with and
without abatement and for both kinds of externality. Notably, in the "tragedy
of the commons" case, the presence of public abatement expenditures allows to
reduce the total fraction of income taxed while the opposite happens in the case
of the "informational" externality.
Two are the main strands of literature which the paper primarily refers
to. The rst one, which explicitly deals with tourism economics issues from a
dynamic point of view, includes the already cited group of works Lanza and
Pigliaru (1994 and 2000), Hazari and Sgro(1995), Smeral (2003), Nowak and
Sahli (2005). The present paper investigates the environmental consequences of
their main results and o¤ers an alternative (and out-of-equilibrium) explanation
for such a positive performance. Among this strand we also remind Lozano et
al. (2005), Gomez Gomez et al. (2004), Rey-Maquieira et al. (2004), Giannoni
and Maupertuis (2005) and Candela and Cellini (2006). Explicitly dealing with
environmental issues, the aims of this group of works are similar to ours though
crucial di¤erences in the modeling strategies and in the level of investigation
exists1 . Moreover, none of these paper allows for an explicit investigation of the
1 In particular, Giannoni and Maupertuis (2005) and Candela and Cellini (2006) adopt
the point of view of a representative tourism rm aiming to maximize its lifetime prot,
while this paper focuses on residentswelfare. Lozano et al. (2005) builds a dynamic general
equilibrium model where also investment in accommodation capacity is taken into account,
but this model only provide social optimum solution. Decentralized and optimal solutions,
without explicit policy analysis, are investigated in Rey-Maquieira et al. (2004) but in a quite
di¤erent framework where the conict between agricultural and tourism sector for the use of
land plays a crucial role. Gomez Gomez et al. (2004) conduct an interesting analysis of the
e¤ects of night stay taxes but, again, no decentralized solutions are taken into account.
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transitional dynamics so that numeric simulations are necessary.
The other important branch of literature which this paper refers to is the
massive "environmental and growth" literature (Gradus and Smulders, 1993,
Smulders and Gradus 1996, Stokey 1998, Tahvonen and Kuuluvainen 1991, etc.,
see Beltratti 1996 and Smulders 2000 for a comprehensive survey of the liter-
ature). What distinguishes this paper from this group of works is that, as
suggested by Papatheodoru (2003), the peculiarities of the tourism sector are
explicitly taken into account. In particular, our framework focuses on the inter-
play between the number of tourists and environmental sustainability and high-
lights a distinctive feature of the tourism industry where the excessive demand
for tourism services provided by a given destination may lead to an impoverish-
ment of the quality of the same and, ultimately, to a worsening of the economic
performance.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the general
analytical framework, section 3 studies the social optimum and the decentralized
solution in the model without abatement while section 4 do the same thing for
the model with abatement. Section 5 concludes.
2 The general analytical framework
2.1 Tourists preferences and the international tourism
market
According to the existing literature (Brau and Cao, 2005, Crouch and Louvière,
2001), a foreign visitor might obtain satisfaction from several sources such as:
1) the quality and the quantity of services supplied by private tourists oper-
ators (accommodation, restaurants, leisure facilities), 2) the quality and the
quantity of public goods provided by local authorities (public transport, infor-
mations, safety) 3) the quality and the quantity of the environmental (amenities,
landscapes, beaches, mountains, parks, climate), cultural (traditional customs
and events, typical food, historical buildings, museums) and social (people be-
haviour, general atmosphere, fascinating attitudes) resources; 4) the degree of
availability and enjoyability of public goods and cultural and environmental
amenities, which is highly correlated and negatively inuenced by the aggre-
gate number of visitors. Since this paper principally focuses on the interplay
between the number of tourists and the stock of environmental, social and cul-
tural resources, we restrict our attention on the last two factors. Accordingly,
we assume that, at any time t; touristssatisfaction are negatively inuenced
by the current aggregate number of tourists Nt and positively inuenced by the
current stock of environmental, social and cultural resources which we gather
in a general index of "environmental quality" denoted by Et2 .
2Taking into account the implications of the di¤erence between purely physical aspects of
the environment and it less tangible aspects, related to the social and cultural sphere, can raise
interesting issues but the economic implications of this distinction goes beyond the purposes
of this paper and we leave it to future works.
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In formalizing touristspreferences we follow the approach used by Gomez
et al. (2004) which relies on the hedonic price theory (Rosen, 1974). The
willingness to pay for tourism services is then given by
pt = tp (Et; Nt) (1)
Where @p@E > 0,
@p
@N < 0 and t = 0e
gt is a parameter whose constant growth
rate g  0 reects upward pressure on relative price of tourism for any perceived
quality of tourism services depending on the interplay between growth in foreign
income and the luxury nature of the tourism good (Crouch, 1995 and Smeral,
2003) or its small elasticity of substitution with other kinds of goods (Lanza and
Pigliaru 1994, 2000). Our economy supplies tourism services in an international
tourism market where a large number of small tourism economies participate.
It is important to highlight that although international competition xes the
price for a given quality of the services, a country could charge a higher price
provided that its services are considered of a higher quality (i.e. characterized
by a higher stock of environmental, cultural and social resources) than other
countries. In other words, the international markets consists in a continuum
of tourism markets di¤erentiated by their quality and the (equilibrium) price
paid for the tourism services. In each of them the suppliers are price-takers but
they can move along the quality ladder due to changes in their environmental
quality.
2.2 Tourism revenues and residentsbehaviour
We assume that each tourist, at any time t; buys one unit of tourism services so
that output at time t is measured in terms of tourist entries Nt. The supply side
of the economy is made up of a large number of identical "households-rms"
which we normalize to 1:We assume that the international demand for tourism
is innite for the price level which corresponds to touristsWTP and is nil for
any other price level3 . So the market clears all the time and the quantity of Nt
exchanged is totally determined by the supply side. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that the country provides tourism services without any labour or
capital costs. In other words, we are assuming that tourists are satised by
simply enjoying the environmental, social and cultural resources of which the
country is naturally endowed. As well see in the next section, the only cost
associated to tourists, the one which prevents the number of tourists to be
innite, is an environmental one.
Given the absence of labour and capital costs, aggregate tourism revenues
correspond to aggregate prots obtained by the households-rms and is repre-
sented by the value of the economys output
TR = Nttp (Et; Nt) (2)
Conceptually, this is not di¤erent from a "production function" of tourism
services where Nt and Et enter as input factors.
3This assumption might look quite restrictive but it helps capturing the volatility of some
kinds of tourism demand.
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The demand side is represented by the same continuum of innitely-lived
"households-rms". Their aggregate utility, at time t; is positively inuenced by
the aggregate level of consumption at time t of an homogenous good purchased
from abroad at a unitary price (Ct) ; and by the stock of environmental, cultural
and social resources at time t (Et) :Their lifetime utility is given by an innite
discounted sum of logarithmic instantaneous utility4
Ut =
Z 1
t
u (Ct; Et) e
 tdt =
Z 1
t
(lnCt +  lnEt) e
 tdt: (3)
Notice that the stock of environmental, social and cultural resources has not
only an (indirect) economic value (by positively a¤ecting the touristswillingness
to pay) but also a value per se (by entering the residentsutility function).
2.3 The evolution of the environmental quality
Wemodel environmental quality as an accumulable stock of renewable resources.
We follow a standard approach in the environment and growth literature which
has been popularized, among the others, by Bovenberg and Smulders (1995) and
Smulders and Gradus (1996). The motion equation of the stock of environmental
quality is then given by
_Et = f (Et)  Pt (4)
where _Et is the derivative of Et with respect to time and Pt is the ow of
pollution at time t. We assume fE < 0 so that the natural absorption capacity
of the environment always decreases as the current stock of environment grows.
Apart from some works (like Brock and Taylor, 2003, Ramirez et al. 2006,
Van Marrewijk et al.1993), the literature tends to accept the view according to
which there is an upper bound to environmental quality. The motivation for this
view (extensively described in Smulders 2001) is highly related to the merely
"physical" interpretation that the literature generally gives to the environmental
quality index and relies on the fact that the higher the quality of the environ-
ment, the more eco-services are needed to sustain this level, whereas the supply
of these services is ultimately limited by solar energy because of the entropy law.
It is questionable whether the assumption of an upper bounded environmental
quality is appropriate even when the latter is intended in our broader sense
(which ts better with tourism-related issues). Nonetheless, leaving the inves-
tigation of the issue for future research, we conform to the standard approach
and we then assume that there is an upper bound E above which environmental
quality is not able to grow.
What are the determinants of the pollution ow P in an economy specialized
in tourism? As already said, we abstract from physical capital in this model
so that all the potential negative impacts of the tourism industry, extensively
4Using a more general instantaneous CES function of the kind u (Ct; Et) =

CtE

t
1 
1 
would not add much in terms of richness of results.
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discussed by Davies and Cahill (2000)5 , are embodied in the variable N . In
other words, pollution is considered as a by-product of the tourism industry.
On the other hand, the country may undertake some actions in order to reduce
this negative impact and may implement some abatement policies. Reasonably
enough, the abatement e¤ort is costly so that a country willing to undertake
an abatement policy should extract resources from the output of the economy.
Accordingly, the function describing the behaviour of the pollution ow may
take the following form
Pt = P (Nt; at) (5)
where at  yt is an absolute measure of the abatement e¤ort and represents
the part of the national income devoted to abate the ow of pollution brought
by tourists. Formalizing the previous intuition, we assume that PN  0 and
Pa  0:
3 A model without public abatement
In this section we analyse and discuss a particular case of the general model
presented above in which abatement e¤orts are totally ine¤ective in reducing
the negative impact of tourists. Then Pa = 0 and the accumulation equation
becomes _Et = f (Et)   P (Nt) : Since abatement is useless, the country need
not devote any resources to it. That is, at = 0 for any t and the whole national
income is used to purchase the consumption good. In order to obtain closed-
form solution we introduce explicit functional forms for the relation introduced
before. In particular, we assume Cobb-Douglas form for touristspreferences
tp (Et; Nt) = tE

t N
  (6)
where  can be interpreted as a measure of preference for the environmental
quality, while  is a measure of crowding aversion. We assume that both 
and  belong to the interval [0; 1)  R2 so that pE  0; pEE  0 and pN ;
pNN  0:6
5Davies and Cahill give an account of the environmental impacts of tourism such as en-
ergy consumption, water consumption, wasters, impact on water and air quality, ecosystems
alteration and fragmentation, impacts on wildlife and on aesthetic and cultural environment.
6Notice that (6) can be also written as
pt = t

Et
nt

n t
so that the willingness to pay can be viewed as an increasing and concave function of "per-
capita environment"

E
n

and an increasing or decreasing concave function of the number
of tourist entries depending on whether     is positive or negative. Alternatively, we can
interpret the inverse of per-capita environment ( n
E
) as a measure of the crowding of the
destination so that we are basically assuming that tourists are crowding-averse. The term
n t can be considered as an additional preference (if  > ) or aversion (if  > ) over the
number of tourists in the destination. In particular, we can associate  >  to a preference
for mass tourism and  <  to a preference for "elite" or snobbish tourism.
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The accumulation equation of the environmental quality takes the following
form which can be also found in Becker (1982), Cazzavillan and Musu (2001),
Gomez et al. (2004), Lozano et al. (2005)
_E = m
 
E   Et
  Nt (7)
As already anticipated, E represents the upper bound to the environmental
quality and
 
E   Et

; the di¤erence between the maximum and the current
level of the environmental quality, can be interpreted as the current stock of
pollution. m 2 (0; 1) is the constant proportion of the stock of pollution which
is assimilated at each date t by the natural factors that govern the economy.
The ow of pollution is P (Nt) = N

t where  is a positive scaling parameter
and  is the positive constant elasticity of the ow of pollution with respect
to N: At this stage of the model, we do not introduce any other restriction on
: When no resources can be devoted to abatement expenditures, residents can
inuence the pollution stock only by controlling tourist entries Nt: We are now
ready to characterize the social optimum
3.1 The social optimum
The problem of the country is to maximize (3) under (7) and the resource
constraint
Ct = tN
1 
t E

t (8)
This is an optimal control problem with one state-variable Et and two control
variables (C and N): However, one control variable can be eliminated by means
of the previous budget constraint. The resulting optimal dynamic system is
_Nt
Nt
=
(+ )Nt
(1  )Et  
+m

(9)
_Et = m
 
E   Et
  Nt (10)
3.1.1 Transitional dynamics and steady state analysis
We are interested in an equilibrium which implies sustainability for the stock
of cultural, environmental and natural resources, i.e., _E = 0: As we can easily
see from (10), _E = 0 implies _N = 0: The two equilibrium manifold _N = 0 and
_E = 0 are given by
_N = 0 : N1 (E) =

(+m) (1  )E
 (+ )
 1

(11)
_E = 0 : N2 (E) =
m

E   m

E
 1

(12)
Existence and uniqueness are easily proved by a quick inspection of the geo-
metrical properties of the two loci. They are two monotonic curves with positive
8
and negative inclination, respectively. Since N2 (E) has a positive vertical in-
tercept, they intersect only once in the positive orthant of the (E;N) plane and
the unique steady state is given by
Eso =
m (+ )
(+m) (1  ) +m (+ )
E (13)
Nso =

m

(+m) (1  )
(+m) (1  ) +m (+ )
E
 1

(14)
As for stability, we can state the following
Proposition 1 The equilibrium (Eso; Nso) is locally a saddle point for the sys-
tem (9),(10)
Proof. See the appendix.
The phase diagram looks as follows
N
E
0E =&
1
mE
h
a
æ ö
ç ÷
è ø
E
0N =&
soE
soN
Fig. 1: Transitional dynamics in the case without abatement.
The characteristics of the transitional path towards the steady state deserves
some comments.
First, notice that along the lower stable arm, both N and E increase over-
time and eventually reach the stable equilibrium for t =1: Since consumption
is a positive function of both the number of visitors ( < 1) and of the environ-
mental quality, consumption grows overtime as well along the lower stable arm.
Finally, as a consequence, also instantaneous welfare is increasing along the
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same manifold. On the other hand, along the upper stable arm, both N and E
decrease overtime before reaching the steady state asymptotically and the same
happen to consumption and welfare. If we take this model seriously and if we
accept the idea that real world situations might be better interpreted in terms of
transitional dynamics than with steady states congurations, some interesting
remarks can be drawn. A country starting from an initial level belonging to the
lower stable arm might be interpreted as a country whose optimal size of the
tourist sector has not been reached yet. Think of a country who have discovered
how to "employ" its environmental amenities for tourism purposes only recently.
For such a country, the model predicts a relatively fast increase in the number
of visitors per unit of time, joint with an increase of the environmental quality7 .
This positive and sustainable growth performance will last forever because the
steady state is reached only for t =1; but its relative speed will decrease as the
economy get closer to the steady state. According to this view, the well-known
high-growth performance of many small open tourism economies need not to be
interpreted as exogenous and equilibrium phenomenon as part of the literature
on tourism tends to do (Lanza and Pigliaru 1994 and 2000, Nowak and Sahli,
2006), but rather as a temporary and transitional phenomenon with no need
to invoke exogenous growth in the terms of trade8 . Tourism development will
eventually stop in the steady state, but such economies will reach this situation
only asymptotically. This not-too-optimistic way to interpret this result, might
be counterbalanced by a less pessimistic one: a country specialized in tourism,
granted that it places itself along the saddle path, needs not deplete completely
its environmental resources which, on the contrary, tends to a constant value.
Hence, tourism specialization appears to be compatible with a sustainable use of
the environmental resources. These observations lead us to a second important
issue related to the transitional dynamics.
What the phase diagram is telling us is that, for any initial value of the en-
vironmental quality, there is one and only initial value of the number of tourists
such that the country is able to place itself along one of the two stable arms.
This is a typical feature of dynamic systems characterized by saddle point sta-
bility, where the dynamic path which tends to the unique steady state is rep-
resented by a manifold having measure zero with respect to the whole state
space. Nonetheless, investigating the economic implications of this somewhat
obvious observation can be highly instructing. It is clear from g. 1 that if the
country starts from an initial value of N which is too high with respect to the
initial value of E; then it will not be able to move along the stable arm and,
sooner or later, it will experience a fast growth in the number of visitors associ-
ated to a fast decrease of the environmental quality. This progressive reduction
7 It is not di¢ cult to associate this situation to the case of many developing (mostly mediter-
ranean) regions (such as Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Malta, Corse, etc) who have experienced
a quite relevant increase in the number of visitors per year associated to a sharp increase in
the gross national product. This increase in visitors doesnt seem to have compromised, so
far, the beuties of their natural resources. On the contrary, it seems that the discovery of
the "economic value" of the environment ( in our model) has determined a higher attention
towards the environmental issues.
8 Its easy to see that previous observations holds even if g = 0:
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will lead, within a nite time, to a zero value of the environmental quality and
therefore to a situation where both consumption and utility are null. In other
words, this path is not sustainable. Then our model envisages the eventuality of
a country experiencing a too fast and unbalanced tourism development which
eventually leads to the death of the tourist destination. For such a country,
both visitors and environmental quality will initially increase jointly, providing
a growing welfare. But there comes a time when the number of visitors will
be so high that the regenerative capacity of the environment is not su¢ cient to
restore the pollution ow provoked by tourists inows. Hence, within a nite
interval of time environmental quality will start to decrease while the number
of visitors continue to growth. Initially, this situation has ambiguous e¤ects on
welfare but these e¤ects are progressively less ambiguous the more environmen-
tal quality approach to a zero value, which is associated to the death of the
country. On the other hand, the model takes into account also the case of an
economy which fails to employ its environmental amenities for tourism purposes
and then its dynamic evolution ends up (within a nite time) with a perfectly
virgin environment (E = E) but with no tourists at all and, therefore, with no
consumption.
Finally, it is worth reecting on the e¤ect that (exogenous) growth might
have on the variables C;N and E: As already said, exogenous growth is intro-
duced in this model by assuming that t = 0e
gt (where g  0 is the rate of
growth of the WTP) and can be thought as the result of continual gains in the
terms of trade9 . By (13) and (14) we note that both tourist inows N and the
environmental quality E are not a¤ected by t so that they remain constant in
steady state even if exogenous growth is introduced. It is worth noticing that
this result still holds when a more general CES instantaneous utility is used in
place of a logarithmic one10 but, on the other hand, it is a direct consequence
of the fact that the parameter  enters the WTP in a multiplicative way. How-
ever, since steady state consumption is equal to Cso = tN
1 
so E

so; it grows at
rate g and growing instantaneous utility in the long-run is obtained preserv-
ing both sustainability of the environment and constant number of visitors. In
other words, an ever-increasing equilibrium price of the tourist services does
not a¤ect individualsdecision over the number of tourists to be hosted in the
destination and the additional monetary resources are employed, date by date,
in additional consumption. This result might have important policy implica-
tions since if we accept the conclusion according to which tourism specialization
is associated with ever-increasing terms of trade, as suggested by both empiri-
cal, then specializing in tourism might allow for an ever-increasing welfare level
in the long-run (which is an obvious consequence of the exogenous growth in
the price of tourism) without compromising environmental sustainability and
keeping the tourist inows to a constant level.
9This approach is used, for example, by Rey-Maquieira et al. (2004).
10With CES utility the rate of growth g a¤ects the level of n and E, but not their constancy
in the steady state. Proof is available at request.
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3.1.2 Comparative statics
The steady state level of the environmental quality: 1) increases with residents
environmental care (@Eso@ > 0); 2) increases (proportionally) with the maximum
level of environmental quality (@Eso
@ E
> 0); 3) increases with the natural rate of
regeneration capacity (@Eso@m > 0); 4) decreases with impatience (
@Ess
@ < 0); 5)
increases with touristscrowding aversion
 
@Eso
@ > 0

; 6) increases with tourists
care for environment

@Eso
@ > 0

and, nally, 7) increases with the elasticity of
the pollution ow with respect to tourists

@Eso
@ > 0

:
As for tourist inows, they 1) decrease with care of the environment

@Nso
@ < 0

;
2) increase with the maximum level of environmental quality
 
@Nso
@ E
> 0

; 3) in-
crease with the regeneration capacity
 
@Nso
@m > 0

; 4) decrease with the parame-
ters related to the marginal impact on the dynamics of E

@Nso
@ < 0;
@Nso
@ < 0

;
5) increase with impatience @Nso@ > 0; 6) decrease with tourists aversion to
crowd
 
@Nso
@ < 0

; 7) decrease with touristscare for environment

@Nso
@ < 0

:
As for consumption, it is interesting to analyze its behavior with respect
to environmental care : A low level of  means a low level of E but a high
level of N: As  grows, the e¤ect on the tourist revenues (and therefore on
consumption) is ambiguous: on the one hand, it allows for a higher steady
state level of the environmental quality and therefore increases tourist revenues
through an higher touristsWTP. On the other, a higher  means a lower steady
state level of N which reduces consumption. By calculations we nd that there
is a level of  = m such that steady state consumption is maximized
11 . If 
is low ( < ) ; an increase in the love for the environment (e.g. as a result of
campaigns to sensitize individuals) gives rise to an increase in consumption too.
This is because, when E is very low, the marginal value that tourists will assign
to the environment is very high so that their WTP grows signicantly when E
increases. This is what happens when  grows starting from very low values. As
long as this positive e¤ect of an increase in  is larger (in absolute term) than
the negative e¤ect of  on Nso; there will be an increase in tourist expenditures
and therefore in consumption too. The relationship reverses when a further
increase in  leads to a value of E such that the increase in touristsWTP is
not able to compensate any longer for the reduction in the number of tourists.
In other words, our model suggests us that too much love for environment means
low consumption levels but, on the other hand, an increase in the environmental
11The same level of  represents instead a maximum when steady state consumption is
considered as a function of impatience  :
@css
@
(
> 0 for  < 
m
= grso
< 0 for  > 
m
= grso
So that an increase in impatience  may give rise to a higher consumption in the steady
state if the love for the environment is su¢ ciently high.
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care might lead to an increase in consumption. Hence, we obtain a sort of golden
rule level of  with respect to consumption.
3.2 Solution with externalities and corrective policies
Whenever a direct intervention of the social planner is not possible, the non-
excludable nature of the environmental quality joint with the high dependence
of tourism revenues on foreign visitorspreference may activate some external-
ities which prevents the decentralized solution to be optimal. These situations
require the investigation of the proper tax design able to create incentives which
induce agents to replicate the social optimum. In what follow we will briey
analyse and discuss these issues with respect to two di¤erent and partially re-
lated kinds of externalities: 1) a typical "tragedy of the commons" externality,
according to which each single agent does not perceive completely its contri-
bution in determining the aggregate number of tourists hosted in the country
at time t; 2) an "information" externality, according to which agents are not
aware of touristspreferences and therefore they do not take into account that
their decisions over the number of tourists to be hosted can negatively inuence
foreignerswillingness to pay either directly (tourists are crowding-averse) or
indirectly (through the stock of environmental resources).
3.2.1 "Tragedy of the commons" externality
In order to capture the e¤ect of this kind of externality, we consider a decen-
tralized version of our economy. We then assume the economy is made up of a
large number of competing "household-rms", which we normalize to 1: Each
of them chooses the number of tourists nt to be hosted at any time t in order to
maximize her lifetime utility. Each single choice of nt concurs to determine the
aggregate number of tourists Nt: The idea typical of the "tragedy of the com-
mons" literature is formalized by adopting an approach similar to Soretz (2003)
and Smulders and Gradus (1996). We assume that agents do not perceive com-
pletely their contribution in determining the aggregate number of visitors at any
time t: The extent to which each household-rm perceives the aggregate num-
ber of tourists Nt to depend on her single decision is parametrized by  2 [0; 1].
Hence, for each household the aggregate number of tourists at any time t is
given by ntN
1 
t :
In equilibrium the aggregate number of tourists equals individual choice
of n because households are identical and the population size is normalized
to 1:  = 1 represents perfect knowledge about the e¤ect of individual n on
aggregate N: On the other hand  = 0 is associated with a situation where the
representative household neglects completely his individual contribution to the
aggregate number of tourists. As a consequence, pollution ow (which depends
on N) is perceived not to depend in anyway on individual choices. Its easy
to conclude that, in the latter case, the rational individual choice would be
that of hosting an innite number of tourists with the obvious consequence that
environmental quality, and therefore consumption, immediately shrinks to zero.
13
Each single household solves the following problem
max
(c;n)
Z 1
0
[ln ct +  lnEt] e
 tdt (15)
s:t: : _Et = m
 
E   Et
  nt N(1 )t and ct = nttEt  ntN1 t  
The resulting dynamic system for the aggregate economy is given by
_N
N
=
(+ )Nt
(1  )Et  
+m

(16)
_E = m
 
E   Et
  Nt (17)
Notice that the di¤erence with respect to the social optimum lies only in the
dynamics of N; while the motion equation for E remains the same.
The transitional dynamics displays the same qualitative behaviour as before,
except that the _N = 0 isocline is steeper. As a consequence, the two isoclines
intersect for an higher value of the number of tourists and for a lower value of
the environmental quality.
Etc =
m (+ )
(+m) (1  ) +m (+ )
E < Eso (18)
Ntc =

m (+m) (1  )
(+m) (1  ) +m (+ )
E
 1

> Nso (19)
Corrective policy In order to reduce tourists inows and then increase steady-
state level of environmental stock, local authorities cannot rely on a direct tax
on foreign tourists (a so-called "tourist tax") because we have assumed perfectly
elastic foreign demand for tourist services so that tourism revenues shrink to
zero for any price level di¤erent from touristsWTP. However, this setting al-
lows for a very simple rst-best policy scheme: local authorities can tax income
and then simply redistribute the tax gains with ex-post lump-sum transfers.
Accordingly, by properly taxing the residents, local authorities induce them to
choose the optimal level of visitors and, by ex-post compensating the latter, it
allows individuals to reach the maximum steady state welfare level. Moreover,
since this corrective tax policy brings the level of tourists inows and of the
environmental asset back to the optimal value, it also increases touristsWTP
and then it basically works as an "implicit tourist tax" on foreigners.
The governments budget balance is given by  tctN
1 
t E

t = vt where  tc
is the tax rate on residentsincome and vt is the lump-sum transfer.
The problem is similar to (15) except that now the budget constraint of each
single household-rm is given by
ct = (1   tc) tEt n1 t N (1 )t + vt (20)
14
where Nt and vt are taken as given.
The aim of government tax is to induce residents to reduce the number of
foreign tourists to be hosted because the tax reduces the marginal utility of n
with respect to the no-tax case. More precisely, the "perceived" marginal utility
of tourists inows is now equal to un =
(1 )(1 tc)
n ; while in the no-tax case
it was 1 n .
The resulting dynamic system for the aggregate economy is
_N
N
=
( (1   tc) + )Nt
(1  ) (1   tc)Et  
+m

(21)
_E = m
 
E   Et
  Nt (22)
As it can easily observed, the accumulation equation of E is not inuenced
so that the aim of the CP is simply to nd a tax rate such that the transitional
dynamics of N coincides with the social optimum. The optimal tax rate tc
which satises this condition is the following12
tc = 1 
 (1  )
 (1  ) +  (1  ) (23)
Given that
@tc
@
> 0;
@tc
@
> 0;
@tc
@
< 0;
@tc
@
< 0
the higher the degree of the externalities ( and ) and the lower the res-
idents environmental care, the higher the tax must be. And, obviously, the
higher the degree of "sense of responsibility", the lower the tax rate. When
 = 1, the optimal tax is zero because the decentralized solution coincides with
the command optimum.
3.2.2 Information externality
In some cases local authorities are much better informed about touristspref-
erences than individual tourist operators. Local authorities might commission
apposite inquiries or have knowledge of studies which are unknown to private
operators. In these cases, it might be appropriate to assume that, in the unregu-
lated economy, each single agent takes tourists preferences as given and therefore
she doesnt realize that her own actions actually a¤ect visitorsWTP13 . This
externality is of a distinct kind with respect to the "tragedy of the commons"
one and therefore we assume  = 1 (perfect sense of responsibility) in order to
focus on the e¤ect of the information externality only.
Each single household solves the following problem
12 It is worth to highlight that this tax rate is meant to be "optimal" not only in the steady-
state but along each trajectory of the system (21), (22).
13The dynamic e¤ect of the same externality has been investigated, in a di¤erent framework,
by Rey-Maquieira et al. (2004).
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max
Z 1
0
[ln ct +  lnEt] e
 tdt (24)
s:t: : _E = m
 
E   Et
  nt ,ct = nttp (Et; nt)
where now p (Et; nt) is given.
The resulting dynamic system for the aggregate economy is given by
_N
N
=
Nt
Et
  +m

(25)
_E = m
 
E   Et
  Nt (26)
Once again, the transitional dynamics displays the same qualitative proper-
ties of the command optimum and, similarly to the case of the "tragedy of the
commons", the main di¤erence relies in the fact that the _N = 0 is steeper than
what it should be to be optimal. Then again, in the steady state, environmental
quality is lower and the number of visitors is higher than in the optimal solution.
Eie =
m
+m+ m
E < Eso (27)
Nie =

m

+m
+m+m
E
 1

> Nso (28)
It is worth to highlight that, in this case, steady state values for E and N are
not functions of the parameters which a¤ects touristspreferences ( and ): As
a consequence, when  = 0 (residents dont care about the environment), the
environmental quality shrinks to zero because agents dont recognise its intrinsic
economic value.
Corrective policy The policy needed induce people to replicate the optimal
dynamic system described by (9) and (10) is identical to the previous case: local
authorities can tax income and then simply redistribute the tax gains with ex-
post lump-sum transfers. The resulting dynamic system for the whole economy
is now given by
_N
N
=
Nt
(1   ie)Et  
+m

(29)
_E = m
 
E   Et
  Nt (30)
where  ie is the income tax rate in the information externality case. Again,
the optimal tax rate which corrects the dynamics of the number of tourists _N
is given by
ie =
+ 
+ 
(31)
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Given that
@ie
@
> 0;
@ie
@
> 0;
@ie
@
< 0
this optimal tax rate depends on the same parameters as the previous one
and changes in the same directions (except for  which is assumed to be equal
to 1): Moreover, as in the previous case, if the government applies a tax 
on residentsincome, tourists are willing to pay more to visit the destination.
Hence part of the tax burden shifts from residents to tourists.
4 A model with abatement expenditures
In the following sections we analyse, discuss and compare the models results
in the most general case when employing resources in the abatement indus-
try is an e¤ective way to reduce pollution (Pa < 0) : In this case, the country
may have incentives to dedicate part of the national income to abatement ef-
forts. A distinctive and crucial feature of pollution abatement is that models
results are highly sensitive with respect to the particular form that pollution
abatement technology displays inside the accumulation equation for the envi-
ronmental quality. In this paper, we make use of the most standard form in
the environmental and growth literature14 , which can be found for example is
Smulders and Gradus (1996) and in Stokey (1998):
P (a;N) =
N
 a
;  >  > 0;  > 0 (32)
It is important to emphasize that, according to this formula, touristsimpact
on pollution is innite when abatement e¤orts are null (lima!1 P =1) : This
apparently extreme assumption might be better justied if we interpret abate-
ment expenditure in broad terms. Indeed, local authorities always dedicate
resources to some kind of activities aiming at reducing the negative marginal
impact of tourists.
4.1 Social optimum
The problem of the country is now to choose the optimal level of consumption
Ct, the optimal level of tourists to be hosted Nt and the optimal abatement tax
rate zt in order to maximize residentswelfare:
max
(Ct;Nt;zt)
Ut =
Z 1
0
(lnCt +  lnEt) e
 tdt (33)
s:t: : _E = m
 
E   Et
  Nt
 at
; Ct = tE

t N
1 
t   at; at = zttEt N1 t
14The implications of di¤erent kinds of abatement technology are analysed in Cerina (2006).
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where zt 2 (0; 1) is the abatement tax rate, that is, the fraction of income
devoted to abatement expenditures.
By equating the rst-order conditions we get
zt =
 (1  )

= z (34)
Hence we nd that the optimal tax rate the government should impose on
residents is constant along every optimal trajectory, being a function of three
constant parameters. In particular, the optimal tax rate is a positive function
of the elasticity of pollution with respect to the abatement e¤ort a

@z
@ > 0

;
a negative function of visitorscrowding aversion (@z@ < 0; the more tourists are
crowding adverse, the less tourists is optimal to host in the country and therefore
the less is the damage they bring to the environment) and a negative function
of the elasticity of pollution with respect to the number of tourists

@z
@ < 0

:
Notice that the behaviour of optimal abatement tax rate follows the behaviour
of marginal value of N in the hamiltonian. In particular, this value is negatively
a¤ected by  (the higher the damage of tourists, the less their economic value
is), positively a¤ected by  (the higher the productivity of abatement , the lower
the "e¤ective" marginal impact of tourists and, hence, the higher their economic
value) and negatively a¤ected by  (the higher touristsaversion to crowding,
the lower their economic value).
The economy is therefore completely described by the following dynamic
system
_N
N
=
(+ )
(1  )
N
 (1 )
t
 zt E
1+
t
+
m
    (1  )
 
E   Et

E
+
g    m
    (1  )(35)
_E = m
 
E   Et
  N (1 )t
 zt E

t
(36)
where z is identied by (34).
4.2 Transitional dynamics and steady state analysis
If we compare the (35) and (36) with (9) and (10) (the latter describing the
evolution of the economy in the no-abatement case), we nd that both _E and
_N depends now on t which is increasing overtime by assumption. In partic-
ular, it can be easily shown that the sustainability condition _E = 0 requires a
growing number of tourists in the steady state. By equating (36) to zero and
by di¤erentiating it with respect to time we nd that
_E = 0,
_N
N
=
g
    (1  )  0:
Then, unlike the case without abatement expenditures, exogenous growth
in the WTP also a¤ects positively the steady state rate of growth of N: This
18
is due to the fact that when WTP grows, also tourism revenues grows and
therefore, at each date, more and more resources are devoted to abatement. As
a consequence, even the carrying capacity of visitors, i.e. the number of tourists
which exactly compensate for the regenerative capacity of the environment,
grows overtime. The steady-state growth rate of N is positively a¤ected by
the exogenous growth rate of the terms of trade (g) and by the measure of the
productivity of abatement () while it is negatively a¤ected by the measure of
the negative impact of tourists on the environment :
An ever-growing number of tourists is a result which might be di¢ cult to ac-
cept once we consider that the limited amount of physical space might be a good
reason for an upper bounded accommodation capacity within a country. How-
ever, 1) this conclusion is consistent with the data and the mechanism on which
it relies might represent an alternative explanation for the observed increas-
ing number of tourists worldwide (WTO, 2006); 2) there are some other works
using a dynamic setting (such as Papatheodoru, 2003) where ever-increasing
number of visitors is introduced as an assumption and justied by the observed
non-stationary patterns of tourists worldwide.
Since N grows constantly in steady state, it is convenient to work with a
new variable that is constant in steady state. Hence we dene the variable
~N = Nte
  g
 (1 ) t called "e¤ective" number of tourists per unit of time t such
that the proper dynamic system to analyse the transitional dynamics is given
by

~N
~N
=
(+ )
(1  )
 ~N
 (1 )
t
 z0E
1+
t
+
m
E Et
Et
  ( m)
    (1  ) (37)
_E = m
 
E   Et
   ~N (1 )t
 z0E

t
(38)
Equilibrium manifolds are

~N = 0 : ~N1 (E) =
 
(1  ) z0E1+t
 (+ ) (    (1  ))

 m  m
E   Et
Et
! 1 (1 )
(39)
_E = 0 : ~N2 (E) =
  
m E  mEt

 z0E

t

! 1
 (1 )
(40)
Unlike the no-abatement case, both the equilibrium manifolds are now rep-
resented by bell-shaped curves having opposite concavity with respect to the
origin. Because of their geometrical form, they intersect only once in the posi-
tive orthant of the (E;N) state space, so the steady state is unique and is given
by
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Easo =
m (+ ) m (1  )
(+m) (1  ) +m (+ ) m (1  )
E (41)
~Naso =

m z0

 
E   Esa

Esa
 1
 (1 )
(42)
As for stability, we can state the following
Proposition 2 The equilibrium (Easo; Naso) is locally a saddle point for the
system (37),(38)
Proof. See the appendix.
The phase diagram doesnt look so di¤erent with respect to the no-abatement
case
N
E
0E =&
E
0N =&
soE
soN
Fig. 2: Transitional dynamics in the case with abatement.
We can easily observe that, apart from the growing number of tourists in the
steady state, the transitional dynamics displays similar qualitative properties
with respect to the no-abatement case, so that the previous arguments applies
here also.
As for the steady state values we note that, quite surprisingly, environmental
quality is lower than in the no-abatement case. This apparently counterintuitive
result can be easily understood by taking a look at the expression (13) of the
steady state value of E in the no-abatement case. In the latter case we have
that @Eso@ > 0 because an increase in the elasticity of pollution with respect to
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visitors, which represents a measure of the environmental damage of tourists,
lowers the marginal value of tourists in the hamiltonian, so that it is optimal
to reduce its number. As a consequence, steady state environmental quality
increases with . When abatement is available, it allows for a reduction of
the elasticity pollution with respect to tourists

@P=P
@N=N

so that now we have
  (1  ) whereas in the no-abatement case we had : Hence @Easo@( (1 )) > 0
and then @Easo@ < 0: In other words, as the productivity of abatement increase,
the social planner nds it optimal to increase the number of tourists at the
expenses of the environment.
4.3 Solution with externalities and optimal policies
We now consider the decentralized version of our economy and we apply the same
analysis we have developed in the no-abatement case. In particular, we calculate
the models solution for the two kinds of market failures introduced before and
we nd the optimal policy design for both cases. In what follows, we assume that
abatement expenditures remain public (i.e. the pollution abatement technology
is available to local authorities only) and the abatement tax rate is set at the
optimal level z = (1 ) :
4.3.1 "Tragedy of the commons" externality and corrective policy
We assume that agents do not perceive completely their contribution in deter-
mining the aggregate number of visitors at any time t: The extent to which
each household-rm perceives the aggregate number of tourists Nt to depend
on her single decision is parametrized by  2 [0; 1]. Hence, for each household
the aggregate number of tourists at any time t is given by ntN
1 
t .
Each single household-rm maximizes its lifetime utility taking Nt, abate-
ment expenditures at and abatement tax z as given. Again, the resulting tran-
sitional dynamics displays similar features with respect to the previous cases.
The only di¤erence relies on the dynamics of the e¤ective number of tourists

~N
~N
=

 (+ )   (1  )
(1  ) (    (1  ))

 ~N
 (1 )
t
 z0E
1+
t
+
m
E Et
Et
  ( m)
    (1  ) (43)
which leads to an excessive number of "e¤ective" tourists and a too low level
of environmental quality in the steady state. In order to correct this market
failure the government may act in a similar manner with respect to the no-
abatement case: it should introduce an additional tax on (gross) income whose
revenues are successively redistributed lump-sum. Each household-rm then
solves the following problem
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max
(c;n)
Z
(ln ct +  lnEt) e
 tdt (44)
s:t: : _Et = m
 
E   Et
   ntN1 t 
at
; ct = (1  atc   z) tEt n1 t N (1 )t + vt;
vt = atctE
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where vt; at; z and Nt are taken as given and atc is the additional tax rate
on income.
This policy does not a¤ect the accumulation equation for E; while the re-
sulting dynamics for ~N is given by

~N
~N
=
0@ 

(+)(1 z) atc
(1 z atc)

(1  ) (    (1  ))   
1A  ~N (1 )t
 z0E
1+
t
+
m
( E Et)
Et
  ( m)
    (1  )
(45)
The optimal tax rate atc which equates the previous dynamic with the
optimal one expressed by (35) is15
atc = 1 
 (1  )

   (1  ) (    (1  ))
 (1  ) (    (1  )) +  (1  ) (46)
The behaviour of this optimal tax rate reects the behaviour of the respective
optimal tax rate in the no-abatement case (tc) as far as the parameters ; ; 
and  are concerned. In particular,
@atc
@
< 0;
@atc
@
< 0;
@atc
@
> 0;
@atc
@
> 0
However, unlike tc; 

atc is also a¤ected by the parameters  and : The
way this parameters a¤ect atc is ambiguous
16
It is interesting to note that, in this case, the total taxation (atc + z =
1  (1 )( (1 ))(1 )( (1 ))+(1 ) ) is lower than in the no-abatement case where tc =
1   (1 )(1 )+(1 ) : In other words, the presence of public abatement reduces
the distortions associated to the excessive use of the common resource E: If we
focus on total taxation, then the role of  and  is not ambiguous at all being
@(atc+z)
@ < 0 and
@(atc+z)
@ > 0, In words, the total optimal tax rate (

atc + z)
decreases with the intensity of the visitors damage on the environment and
increases with the e¤ectiveness of abatement.
15Notice that if  = 0; the expression for atc collapses to tc:
16We have
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4.3.2 Information externality
As in the no-abatement case, we also consider the situation when agents are not
informed about touristspreferences. As in the no-abatement case, we assume
 = 1 so that the e¤ect of the "tragedy of the commons" externality is neutral-
ized. Each single household-rm maximizes its lifetime utility taking tourists
WTP, abatement expenditures at and abatement tax z as given. Again, there
are no signicative di¤erences in the resulting transitional dynamics which dis-
plays similar qualitative behaviour with respect to the previous cases. Therefore
we go straight to the e¤ects of the corrective policy design, which is the same
as the one implemented in the "tragedy of the commons" case. As usual, the
dynamics of E remains unchanged while the resulting dynamics of ~N is given
by

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
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where aie is the additional tax rate on tourism revenues. As usual, the
government chooses the particular tax rate which is able replicate the optimal
dynamics of ~N; expressed in (35). This optimal tax rate is given by17
aie =
 (    (1  )) + 
 (    (1  )) +   
 (1  )

(48)
Analogously to the no-abatement case, we have
@aie
@
< 0;
@aie
@
> 0;
@aie
@
> 0
Similarly to the tragedy of the commons case, the optimal tax rate is now
also ambiguously a¤ected by  and .18 . This ambiguity is once again canceled
out if we consider total tax rate (aie + z) instead of 

aie only. In particular, the
signs of the derivatives with respect to  and  are the same as in the "tragedy
of the commons" case
@
 
api + z

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< 0;
@
 
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
@
> 0
However and interestingly enough, unlike the previous case here the total tax
rate

aie + z =
( (1 ))+
( (1 ))+

is higher with respect to the no-abatement
case

ie =
+
+

: In other words, the presence of abatement increases the
distortion introduced by the unawareness of touristspreferences.
17Again, notice that for  = 0 we have aie = 

ie:
18We have
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5 Conclusions
The positive growth performance of small open economies specialized in tourism
poses interesting questions regarding the role that environmental resources play
in the long term prospects of such countries and in the sustainability and e¢ -
ciency of their process of development. Our paper presents a simple analytical
framework where some of these questions can start to be answered properly. We
have built a dynamic general equilibrium model where a small open economy
specialized in tourism based on environmental resources has to choose the num-
ber of tourists to be hosted, the level of consumption and the fraction of income
to be devoted to abatement e¤orts in order to maximize the long-run welfare of
its residents by taking into account the several dynamic trade-o¤s associated to
this choice. We have analysed the dynamic properties of the model in two dif-
ferent versions, with and without abatement expenditures and in both versions
a unique steady-state is found to be a saddle point. The analysis of the tran-
sitional dynamics allows us to provide an alternative and "out-of-equilibrium"
interpretation for some stylized facts that the literature tends to explain as equi-
librium phenomenon. As a consequence of our particular setup, growth cannot
be sustained in the long-run by any endogenous factor but the presence of ex-
ogenous growth in the terms of trade allows for an increasing consumption in
the long-run without compromising environmental sustainability. Only when
public abatement is allowed, exogenous growth in the terms of trade, by raising
the carrying capacity at any date, also leads to constant increase in the number
of visitors in the long-run. As a counterpart, steady state environmental quality
is reduced when abatement technology is available, so that agents prefers to
raise the number of tourists at the expenses of the environmental quality.
Finally, we have analysed the issue of market failures by taking into account
the implications of two kinds of externality: 1) a typical "tragedy of the com-
mons" situation, suggested by the non-excludable nature of the environmental
good; 2) an "informational" externality according to which agents are not aware
of touristspreferences. We have solved the model for both kinds of external-
ities and with or without abatement expenditures, comparing the steady-state
properties with the respective social optimum solutions. We have implemented
the proper corrective policy design and we have found the closed-form solution
for the optimal tax rate able to induce the unregulated economy to replicate
the social optimum transitional dynamics. The policy design we have proposed
di¤ers from those actually implemented in some Mediterranean regions (such as
Sardinia and Corsica) because in our model taxes are not paid by tourists but
by residents. However, insofar it leads to an increase in a tourists willingness
to pay, our corrective policy always works as an "implicit tourist tax" paid by
foreign tourists who are, on the other hand, compensated with a better quality
of the service purchased. Finally, the presence of public abatement is found
to reduce the total fraction of income taxed in the "tragedy of the commons"
case while it would raise total scal incidence in the case of the "informational"
externality. Although the model presented is very stylized, we believe it raises
interesting policy implications and provides informations about the role of en-
24
vironment in the development of the tourist sector. These informations can
be useful for policymakers who are facing the choice between investing their
resources in tourism or in more high-intensive technology sectors.
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A Proof of proposition 1
Linearizing the system (9),(10) around the unique steady state we yield
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B Proof of proposition 2
Linearizing the system (35),(36) around the unique steady state we yield
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